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Please note that I am pursuins this appeal pro se for financial reasons. 
As a layperson, I ask you to please excuse the form of this response brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
Without conceding the points in the Brief of Appellee not specifically 
addressed herein, I offer the following in response to the Brief of Appellee: 
(1) Abuse of Discretion. With due respect to the trial court, we believe 
that it was an abuse of discretion to mechanically reduce attorneys' fees by 
seventy-five percent (75%) for the following reasons: 
(A) The "non-compensable" contract claims are indispensable to the 
compensable mechanic's lien claim on which we prevailed; 
(B) There was significant overlap among all claims; 
(C) The total amount of attorney's fees we requested was reasonable 
and in no event burdensome to Southwest, which itself precipitated 
the need for litigation to trial by wrongfully placing and refusing to 
remove the lien on our home; and 
(D) The disparity between the fees we requested ($17,243.50) and the 
principal recovery ($3,747) was a function of the current rate for 
legal fees in the community, and in no event a result of wasteful 
billing on the part of our trial attorney. 
Moreover, we believe it was an abuse of discretion to disregard the public 
policy implications of the award, to wit: the effective denial of access to the 
Utah courts in all cases where the amount in controversy is low, and the 
encouragement of reckless lien practices. Despite the high standard of 
review, we trust the Utah Court of Appeal will take an interest in these 
matters. 
(2) Pro Se. Appellee complains that our brief does not comply with Rule 
24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Before preparing the Brief of 
the Appellant, however, we were given permission by the Court clerk to 
make a reasonable effort to follow the proper procedures. We did so in good 
faith. In any event, as pro se appellants, we are asking the Court to look 
beyond the form of our presentation to the substance of our arguments. 
(3) Irrelevance of Southwest "Project File". Appellee's attempt to 
distract the Court's attention with a claim that the countertops as installed 
comported with notes in its internal files - notes nowhere signed or 
acknowledged by me or my wife, nor seen by me or my wife until they were 
produced in Discovery - is an insult to this Court's intelligence and to the 
trial court's Findings. The trial court specifically found that "Defendant 
failed to perform pursuant to the terms of this agreement because it installed 
countertops in the bathroom that were 3A inch thick with a flat, polished 
edge." (Record at 77, Paragraph 6 of Conclusions.) 
(5) Irrelevance of Fact That Parties' Agreement was "Oral". While the 
parties' agreement was oral (between me and my wife, on the one hand, and 
Southwest representative Mark Burnett, on the other), that does not impair 
its validity. Like Appellee's attempt to distract the Court's attention with 
references to its internal "notes," Appellee's characterization of the parties' 
agreement as an "[Oral] Contract," see Brief of Appellee, p. 8, should be 
disregarded. 
(6) Misstatement of Trial Court's Conclusion. Appellee states on page 4 
of its Brief, "The Trial Court concluded that Appellee had not installed 
countertops of the wrong thickness." (Emphasis added.) Perhaps this was a 
typographical error. In fact, the trial court concluded as follows: 
"Defendant failed to perform pursuant to the terms of this agreement 
because it installed countertops in the bathroom that were % inch thick with 
a flat, polished edge." (Record at 77, Paragraph 6 of Conclusions.) 
(7) Apparent Inapplicability of Allen v. Friel. It appears from Appellee's 
own description of the case that Allen v. Friel is not on point. In Allen, the 
pro se appellant's procedural flaws (i.e., failure to follow the appellate rules, 
failure to provide portions of the record central to the appeal) were 
compounded by substantive flaws (i.e., pro se appellant failed to identify 
flaws in the district court's order to be reversed, and failed to show that there 
was not a reasonable basis in the record to support the district court's 
holdings). In contrast, we believe we have identified flaws in the trial 
court's order to be reversed (e.g., failure to consider important public policy 
ramifications of the award and failure to consider that: (i) the "non-
compensable" contract claims are indispensable to the compensable 
mechanic's lien claim on which we prevailed, (ii) there was significant 
overlap among all claims, (iii) the total amount of attorney's fees we 
requested was reasonable and in no event burdensome to Southwest, which 
itself precipitated the need for litigation to trial by wrongfully placing and 
refusing to remove the lien on our home, and (iv) the disparity between the 
fees we requested ($17,243.50) and the principal recovery ($3,747) was a 
function of the current rate for legal fees in the community and not a result 
of wasteful billing on the part of our trial attorney). For the same reasons, 
we also believe we have shown that there was not a reasonable basis in the 
record to support the district court's mechanical, seventy-five percent (75%) 
reduction of attorney's fees. While we broadly concede our procedural 
errors in this appeal, as pro se appellants, we are at a loss to correct them. 
Notwithstanding this, we pray that this Court will evaluate and validate the 
substance of our arguments. 
In this connection, it is also not known by us whether the cases cited by 
Appellant (i.e., Jolivet and Steagall) are about pro se appellants. If not, we 
would suggest that they, too, are inapplicable. 
(8) Mischaracterization of Appellants' "Refusal to Pay." On page 12 of 
the Brief of Appellee, Appellee states "It was the refusal of the Appellants to 
pay any potion of this billing related to the subject countertops that resulted 
in the filing of the mechanic's lien and pursuit of collection." This statement 
is misleading. In fact, Southwest performed a great deal of kitchen and tile 
work in our home, and it was paid in full and on time for all of it, in an 
amount approximating Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($17,000). Given that, 
and the fact that Southwest representative Mark Burnett immediately 
acknowledged Southwest's error, my wife and I were, and continue to be, at 
a loss to understand why the owner of Southwest would not have even 
returned our many telephone calls regarding the bathroom countertops 
before filing the lien against our new home. Please recall, in this 
connection, that the charge to us for the bathroom countertops was to have 
been $2,000, a mere fraction of the $19,000 of work we had ordered for the 
home, and that the cost to Southwest of the bathroom countertops was only 
$800. (This latter piece of information was provided to us by Southwest 
representative Mark Burnett.) In any event, we reached an agreement with 
Mr. Burnett that we would keep the wrong countertops (which actually had a 
negative value to us) for no charge (i.e., that Southwest would write its own 
mistake off). In short, any implication of a "refusal to pay" on our part is 
wholly wrong. 
(9) Dispute Over Hours Must Be Viewed in Larger Context: Appellee 
quibbles with the number of hours spent by our attorney in bringing this 
,ii«iter to trial. We believe that this quibbling must be evaluated in terms of 
the big picture. To wit, is Seventeen Thousand Dollars ($17,000) for any 
litigation to trial and judgment unreasonable? The answer must certain!} be 
illI As Your Honors know, litigation over a $2,000 countertop costs the 
same as litigation over a $20,000 countertop or a $200,000 countertop \ d 
in the instant case, we had no choice but to litigate to trial because 
Southwest refused to remove the lien from our home In am event, the 
$17,000 was billed by our attorney, and paid by a ; ^ood faith, and even 
Judge Ludlow said the amount was reasonable. Thus, the result of the ii:a. 
court's mechanical reduction of those fees by 7*% ;r tl\\i \w litigants with 
a relatively small amount in controversy - are effectively punished for 
pursuing our contract and real property rights. This must surely be contrary 
to Utah public policy, and an injustice to i is personally. 
(10) Misrepresentation of Disparity Between Attorney's Fees and Amount 
in Controversy, Disturbingly, Appellee misrepresents the disparity between 
the total amount of Appellants' attorney's fees and the amount in 
controversy. See Brief of Appellee, page 8 ("Appellants made a claim for 
attorney's fees which exceeds the amount of recovery by more than 
1100%."). In fact, the cost of the countertops plus the cost of replacement 
(both of which costs were awarded to Appellant on the breach of com rat* 
claim) totals $3,747, making the ratio of attorney's fees to costs miire like 
460%. But even this number must be viewed in terms of the larger context: 
If we are serious about affording litigants the right to protect their contract 
and real property rights in court, then we must accept that in cases where the 
amount in controversy is low but a litigant's contract and real property 
rights are nonetheless wrongfully jeopardized— there will be a disparity 
between attorney's fees and the amount in controversy. As long as the 
attorney's fees are reasonable in the community, and the trial court 
acknowledged that they were, the disparity should not be a bar to full 
recovery of attorney's fees for the prevailing party. 
{i i j Unfairness oi iviechanical Reduction. As laypeople, my wife and I are 
at a loss to understand how we prevailed on the underlying breach of 
contract claim and yet not on the abuse of lien claim: If (as the trial court 
found) Southwest did not give us the benefit of our bargain and we ow ed 
them nothing, then why was it not abusive for Southwest to place a lien on 
our home? More to the point of this appeal, why are we forced to bear 75% 
of our attorney's fees when we owed Southwest nothing for installing the 
wrong bathroom countertops? The mechanical reduction of attorney's fees 
by 75% would be understandable if the three other claims in this action were 
unrelated (e.g., breach of contract and trespass). But in actuality, all claims 
in the action are irrevocably intertwined. Inexplicably, the trial court 
acknowledged this, but went on to find that "26.35 hours [1/4 of attorney 
fees actually billed and paid for] is a fair and reasonable amount of time to 
have spent on the mechanic's lien claim and [that] an award for that time 
adequately vindicates plaintiffs rights under the statute." \ due respect 
to the trial court, we believe it was an abuse of discretion for the court not to 
have considered that our prevailing on the mechanic's lien claim was 
contingent on our winning the breach of contract issue. Given that one 
claim was contingent on the other, how can our request for fees for the 
remaining 75% of our attorney's work be denied consistent with equity and 
Utah public policy? 
(12) Designation of Appellant. Appellee characterizes as - j-'.^h/'u.u uu 
fact that I isked to be addressed as "Dr. Bircoll" during the triai proceedings 
: ui introduced myself as "Mel" in our telephone mediation. See Brief of 
Appellee, p. 9t This is neither posturing nor inconsistent: I introduce myself 
by my first name in informal settings but as a retired medical doctor, do ask 
to be addressed by my correct title in more formal proceedings. I ask the 
Court to ignore Appellant's personal attack against me and against my status 
as a,pro se appellant in this action. 
Thank you for your consideration. 
Respectfully submitted 
Mel Bircoll, M.D. 
